Abstract-In the upcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), privacy by design and privacy impact assessments are given an even more prominent role than before. It is now required that companies build privacy into the core of their technical products. Recently, researchers and industry players have proposed employing threat modeling methods, traditionally used in security engineering, as a way to bridge these two GDPR requirements in the process of engineering systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has not only changed the way systems are accessed, but also how they are developed. Software engineering has evolved with the availability of connectivity, allowing what used to be large applications that run on one machine, to distributed applications that can cooperate with other systems to provide richer services. The move from monolithic to service-based architectures was accompanied with a shift from waterfall to agile methodologies in software engineering. Agile methodologies are geared towards better, cheaper and faster software development, which respond rapidly to customer's needs [1] , while services can be used to harness the complexity of distributed systems and to integrate different software applications [2] .
As software systems become ubiquitous in users' lives, privacy ought to be central in their development. However, it remains an urgent yet neglected concern as evident from the many privacy violations reported by researchers and journalists [3] - [7] . These violations often underline that privacy is a technical, as well as legal matter, a point of view also reflected in recent legal developments that explicitly require data controllers to engage in privacy by design [8] , [9] .
Privacy by design requires developers to take privacy seriously from the beginning of system development. Privacy Engineering aims to provide developers with a set of Software Engineering methods, techniques and tools that they can employ in this endeavor [10] . A classical method from security engineering, that can be applied in the context of privacy engineering is Threat Modeling. Threat modeling can be used to recognize privacy threats, address them in a systematic way, and make sure they are effectively mitigated. In the gist of Privacy by Design, to be effective, Threat Modeling has to be a part of software projects from the beginning.
This conception of a beginning and end of development is, however, residual of waterfall models and monolithic architectures that dominated software production until recently. Traditionally, threat modeling activities are coupled to the different phases of the waterfall workflow, starting with a global view of the ultimate design. In contrast, agile is much more incremental, while services lack centralized control. Some proposals to update threat modeling for securing systems developed in agile environments has been made, e.g., SDL for agile, and Beznosov and Kruchten [11] . However, little has been done to address the challenges associated with the adventurous activity of applying threat modeling for privacy in the brave new world of agile and service oriented architectures. This paper explores the challenges and the opportunities introduced to Privacy Threat Modeling by the combination of Agile methodologies and service-oriented architectures. It does so based on key texts and survey papers written on the topics by practitioners and researchers, respectively. We set the stage in section II by first defining privacy goals, which include but also go beyond the CIA triad used in security. Section III describes how Threat Modeling has traditionally been done, section IV summarizes what is different in an Agile development workflow and in a Service-oriented architecture, and section V relate these changes to challenges in Privacy Threat Modeling. Section VI describes how certain characteristics of agile services bring a new set of opportunities to the Threat Modeling process. Finally, section VII and section VIII provide a general discussion of the results, a short evaluation of the use of Machine Learning for privacy threat modeling and insights into future research.
II. PRIVACY GOALS
Traditionally, Threat Modeling (TM) has been used for systematically addressing security issues in software products. However, due to the proximity between privacy and security goals, as well as in techniques to achieve these goals, Threat Modeling has come to be seen as a method that can be used to drive some of the privacy by design activities [12] - [14] . In this paper, we specifically focus on threat modeling for privacy.
The relationship between privacy and security goals in systems development is complex. The implementation of any privacy solution depends on basic security mechanisms to be in place. However, some privacy problems require further mechanisms different from security. Prior work has shown these problems raise from three different paradigmatic approaches to privacy [10] , [15] , [16] .
First, problems targetting the opacity of the individual, such as hiding metadata from unauthorized parties, rely heavily on achieving confidentiality, integrity and availability with respect to a broader definition of information than merely the contents of a message. Second, problems related to the control of data by the individual, which can be contained by enhancing the accountability and transparency of organizations collecting and processing information, also need procedural mechanisms with respect to data subjects, regulators, and the general public. Finally, neither confidentiality nor control are in and of themselves sufficient to ensure the design of systems that facilitate good social interactions respectful of privacy norms. Achieving the latter may be supported technically by translating social and ethical norms around information flows into design; providing users with feedback about system functionality to aide in privacy decision making; and, making transparent potential impact of complex information systems and practices on individual and social privacy.
These three approaches around confidentiality, control and collective information practices are distinct but complimentary, and have their own set of goals [10] , [15] , [16] .
We assume that the objective of privacy engineering is to address privacy concerns by implementing mechanisms that guarantee confidentiality, enable transparency and control, while facilitating respectful information practice. If so, then privacy threat modeling is concerned with whether these mechanisms can be violated, in effect, violating the selected privacy goals. Confidentiality, control and practice goals are distinct in the design principles they leverage and the techniques they rely on, e.g., using encryption, access control models, user studies respectively. The application of these design principles and techniques may be more or less challenging in agile service environments. The latter may also impact the mitigation of threats to each of the three privacy goals, a matter we analyze in section V. For the sake of providing greater granularity, we list subgoals that are necessary to achieve confidentiality, control and practice.
1) Confidentiality:
The exposure of information to unintended entities leads to a privacy loss [16] . There are four goals that help to achieve privacy as confidentiality. They apply classical security mechanisms used to protect organizational assets for the protection of user privacy:
• PG1: Distributed trust.
• PG2: Confidentiality of data at rest and in transit.
• PG3: Public access of source code.
• PG4: Data minimization. 2) Control: Informational self-determination aspires to improve data subjects' the ability to exercise control over their personal data flows [16] . Techniques that guarantee people's ability to determine when, how and to what extent information is exchanged between parties [17] fulfill the control goal. The following subgoals help achieve privacy as control:
• PG4: Data minimization.
• PG5: Making transparent personal data collection or processing.
• PG6: Giving control over personal data collection or processing.
• PG7: Accountability.
3) Practice: Some aspects of privacy cannot be enforced through the implementations of systems. Social boundaries are defined by a number of actions taken by one or more individuals with regards to their identities and related information. Systems may mediate between them through mechanisms and principles designed to facilitate certain privacy practices. Three different privacy goals can guide the implementation of good privacy practices:
• PG8: Promote collective information practices in design.
• PG9: Provide decision making mechanisms.
• PG10: Provide feedback and raise awareness of the affordances and impact of the system. Privacy threat modeling hence consists of the activities to discover, address and validate threats that affect the realization of the above privacy goals.
III. THREAT MODELING ACTIVITIES
Threat Modeling in IT systems is the product of researchers and practitioners in academia, industry and military. We aggregated descriptions from different sources [12] , [13] , [18] - [21] , taking the common elements and following the logical order of [13] , to provide a short overview of the four major activities that constitute Threat Modeling.
TM1: Characterizing the system: create a system model that emphasizes its main characteristics, in order to understand its components and their interconnections [19] . Software models are useful for establishing a common understanding of the system in the team, and for abstracting away functional details that are not relevant to perform the privacy analysis [13] . Important elements that can be characterized in software diagrams are assets [13] , [19] , and trust boundaries [13] , [19] . TM2: Elicit threats: list the threats that can affect the system.
Oladimeji et al [20] provide a comprehensive list of techniques that can be used to this effect. Among them, existing literature has focused on reviewing a list of attacks per asset [19] ; using threat catalogs (e.g. [12] ); following classification schemes [12] ; and analyzing possible scenarios (e.g. Attack Trees [18] ). TM3: Threat and Risk analysis: determine the degree to which the system is susceptible to threats [20] . Oladimeji et al. divide this analysis into the following steps: threat decomposition, threat prioritization, severity/cost assessment, and threat mitigation. They claim that this process can be done iteratively, refining the analysis as the context becomes more fine grained. Shostack asserts that assessing risks can be expensive, and focuses on the importance of addressing threats at the technology level.
He also stresses the need to manage the threats as issues, making sure the list gets updated as new threats are added, removed or changed. TM4: Validate: provide quality assurance to the final product by verifying that all of the threats have been addressed in an effective way. Shostack claims that a common way to check if the mitigations are effective is to incorporate runnable tests to the test suite. In this case, any third party software that has been integrated into the system should also be examined. Priya and Arya [21] also give a prominent place to software testing as a way to embed Threat Modeling into the Secure Software Development Lifecycle. In contrast, Oladimeji et al. propose to validate the model first taking into account the different countermeasures available, and then evaluating them using refinements, correlations and the semantics of the solution. In a setting where waterfall methodologies and monolithic architectures are applied, the four activities provide the basis for a comprehensive analysis, effective solutions and quality assurance with respect to security and privacy goals. However, with the shift towards agile methodologies and services, teams that are expected to perform these activities for analyzing and mitigating privacy threats are likely to face new challenges. To explore what these challenges are, we first describe some of the main tenets of these two shifts.
IV. SHIFTS IN SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
Traditionally, software projects were executed by following a series of steps in sequence, with some iteration, from gathering requirements to deployment [22] . However, waterfall methods and their variants have been criticized for not accommodating frequent changes in the requirements (which happen virtually in every project), and too frequently delivering the wrong product for the customer, later than expected and costlier than planned [23] .
Agile methodologies aspire to respond to these by proposing techniques that enable teams to better accommodate changes throughout development and giving up on big design up front. In particular, the family of methods' focus on working software and interaction with the customer is reflected in a series of principles laid out in a seminal manifesto by the Agile Alliance [24] . Pantiuchina et al. have shown that a majority of organizations have increased their development pace by adopting certain agile practices [25] . These, together with other principles related to the software artifact, are relevant to the threat modeling process. They are the following:
1) The system design must be flexible enough to accommodate new requirements anytime. Software will be developed iteratively, implementing new requirements each sprint while maintaining existing functionality. Changing requirements during software development is one major reason proponents reject the simple waterfall model, and addressing them is expected to lead to more customer satisfaction [26] . 2) Working software should be delivered frequently. Customer needs are assumed to evolve through the use of systems. Frequent delivery allows developers to address them in fixed-timed iterations where priorities are set based on feedback from the customer [26] . 3) To transfer knowledge and convey critical information, developers should prioritize face-to-face meetings rather than read-only documentation. This preference for oral communications is expected to enhance the global understanding of the system and diminish the need for detailed diagrams and exhaustive reports. 4) Working software is the primary measure of progress, and Test Driven Development enables developers to show what is already done, and third parties to check it is so correctly. Together with face-to-face meetings, working software has been shown to be more effective vehicle of communication than written documentation [26] .
The rise of agile methodologies have been accompanied by substantial changes in software architectures. Throughout the 90s and most of the 00s, applications were built as monoliths, designed to realize a single executable artifact where modules could not be executed independently [2] . Monoliths have proven to be difficult to maintain, time consuming to debug and very difficult to execute large deployments due to source code complexity [2] .
Services are designed to cope with these problems, and they are increasingly gaining popularity [2] . Services are self-describing, platform-agnostic computational elements that are meant to support rapid, low-cost composition of distributed applications [27] . They expose their main functionality through public API calls, while the internals are hidden to external parties. Teams build services depending mostly on themselves (high cohesion), and third party services are still available, yet with a very concrete scope of functionality (loose coupling) [2] . Microservices, the latest trend in developing software as a service, enable flexible, modular and maintainable evolving systems that are completely independent both in development and in deployment. These two definitions expose four essential properties, namely self-describing, platform-agnostic, independent development and independent deployment.
V. CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL THREAT MODELING PROCESS
The shift towards Agile methodologies and service-based applications introduces a number of new requirements and challenges to Threat Modeling (TM). We identify these challenges based on an analysis of the impact that agile principles and services properties have on the traditional TM activities, which is supported by the literature review carried out in sections III and IV. The following subsections introduce 21 challenges, grouped by activity, and related to one or more principles and properties.
A. Characterizing the system
As stated in section III, this activity aims to create a system model that emphasizes its main characteristics [19] .
Agile methodologies emphasize face-to-face meetings and working software as a vehicle of more efficient communications compared to written documentation [24] . However, in TM, system characterization, often captured in a diagram and maintained throughout the project, forms the basis of all other activities [28] 
(C1).
A possible partial solution to this problem is to keep such a diagram as high level as possible, reflecting only those characteristics that play a role in the business logic of the application and are relevant to its privacy goals [29] . However, a high level diagram may lack details about components necessary to support the elicitation of threats (TM2) [30] . This poses a further challenge, as the information available in the diagram may lead to vague privacy requirements due to the absence of important details (C2).
A highly modular diagram can help to overcome this challenge. Teams may independently update their components, as well as easily identify and provide useful information to support TM2. However, some privacy goals (e.g. data minimization) may affect multiple components at once, making the modularization of the diagram insufficient for addressing all privacy goals (C3).
Finally, working software as a measure of progress disconnects the diagram from the system implementation. Programmers could update the characterization as the implementation gets completed, stumbling upon C1. Moreover, the details of the solution may be relevant to a privacy goal, forcing them to perform the update. This documentation step shifts developers' focus away from working software and challenges their understanding of the relationships between components as well as the privacy impact of the changes [31] (C4).
B. Elicit threats
Once the characterization is in place, the objective in TM is to enumerate possible threats to the system in order to identify appropriate mitigation strategies.
In agile environments, the system is expected to evolve rapidly. As the system evolves new threats can be found, changed or removed (C6). The accelerated development pace of an Agile team underlying system evolution makes it difficult to keep a threat list up to date (C5). Ideally, the activity of finding threats must be performed iteratively and rapidly [32] .
With its emphasis on customer communication, Agile enhances the potential of introducing participatory design methods into the development process. This could prove an advantage for privacy. However, traditional requirements engineering methods may require too much time (C7) and customers may not possess enough domain knowledge (C8) to elaborate on the impact of small iterative changes on potentially unclear privacy requirements.
Reviewing attacks for each asset requires developers to embed adversarial thinking into their development workflow. Even if they are willing to do so, it is possible that some realistic threats [13] do not occur to them due to the cultural deformation of the security and privacy mindset caused by the popularization of hacker movies (C9): developers may focus on spectacular, highly sophisticated and highly unlikely attacks that do not take into account more traditional and effective techniques. One possible solution to this problem is to bring security and privacy experts into the discussion, but then the development process slows down (C10) and is likely to incur greater costs.
Deriving threats from business goals is aligned with the Agile philosophy, especially if we consider these goals as high level requirements. However, as we saw in the previous section, deriving concrete security and privacy requirements may require low level knowledge about the system implementation (C11).
Threat catalogues that are easy to use and widely available may enable Agile teams to find threats both recurrently and quickly [33] . Nevertheless, it is impossible to provide a complete catalogue of all possible privacy threats [33] , limiting the effectivity of threat catalogs (C12) and may lead to failures in threat discovery.
LINDDUN [12] , for example, provides a classification scheme following the model of STRIDE [13] . The goal is to derive specific threat instances associated to each element of the system by considering which of the 7 proposed privacy threat types is present in a given element [12] . The categories provide a systematic body of knowledge that is suitable for fast and recurrent activities. Yet, deriving the specific threats each time from all categories may take as much as one hour per threat [34] and requires privacy expertise (C13).
Analyzing possible scenarios, considering an insider threat and assessing system boundaries are powerful techniques that can be systematically performed only by expert threat modelers [13] . However, they require a level of creativity that makes their recurrent exercise difficult (C14).
One way to deal with activities that need to be executed rapidly and iteratively is to automate them, increasingly a common parlance. In section VII, we briefly discuss this approach taking as an example Amazon Macie [35] .
C. Threat and Risk analysis
To manage all the threats identified in the previous step, it is necessary to analyze them and potentially consider the risk they pose to an organization. Threat analysis aims to provide a suitable solution to all the threats, while risk analysis may help to prioritize or discard some of them.
Prioritizing threats fits well into the frequent delivery model of Agile methodologies. Once the main threats have been identified, the developer team can focus on addressing only those that are relevant to the changes of a specific version. A risk assessment process can be introduced to prioritize threats. However, risk assessment can be both difficult and time consuming [13] ; it will slow down the release process of an agile team (C15); and, may not provide the right frame for developers to prioritize risks or analyze threats that may arise due to cascade failures caused by combinations of services [36] 
(C16).
Threat mitigation is usually delivered through changes to technological design [13] . The place to make these changes is highly relevant, as one mitigation may address several threats at once [13] . Rapid changes to the architecture [37] , including adding new services, makes the identification of these places more difficult (C17).
One alternative is to choose the services in a way that minimizes the risk of having to change mitigations. Highly reputed services with clearly defined purposes are candidates to be part of such an architecture, as they will reliably provide basic and well delimited functionality. However, this scenario introduces another challenge when coordinating the implementation of the mitigations. Third party services may be required to collaborate, even when they are run by different organizations [2] , in order to identify threats caused by their combination and to deploy strategic mitigations. This directly impacts those businesses that run services that serve potentially different applications with the same problem but with conflicting requirements (C18).
Furthermore, even if the organizations agreed on a set of common mitigations, the absence of both a common security infrastructure and a global system to enforce rules creates governance problems in implementing mitigations [2] (C19).
D. Validate
To provide quality assurance to the Threat Model, Shostack [13] and Priya and Arya [21] focus on incorporating security tests into the general software test suites, while Oladimeji et al. [20] propose to consider several countermeasures and analyze their effectiveness through e.g. their semantics.
Agile methodologies emphasize automated testing, with techniques like Test Driven Development (TDD) [38] . Incorporating security tests that validate the mitigations into the general test suite may be a productive way [23] to keep the threat model consistent with the frequent deliveries and update requirements. However, some privacy goals are difficult to test automatically due to the availability of the necessary inputs (C20). For instance, testing the distribution of trust among entities (PG1) requires architectural information that is not explicitly expressed in lines of code.
The manual analysis that Oladimeji et al. [20] propose cannot be easily automated and requires both expertise and documentation (C21). In an agile environment, this adds two challenges with regards to the frequent deliveries: there is one more step in the release process and a specific group of experts must be available to do it. Furthermore, keeping this documentation up to date and re-evaluating countermeasures in updated components limit the flexibility of the product design.
VI. OPPORTUNITIES BROUGHT BY AGILE AND SERVICES
Here, we contrast the challenges identified in the previous section with how certain aspects of agile services can also ease identifying and mitigating threats to privacy goals. In Table I , we summarize both the opportunities and the challenges agile service environment create with regards to both the TM activities and the Privacy Goals.
A. Agile: challenges and opportunities
Agile allows for the effective analysis of complex problems and the solid and iterative progress, at the expense of complicated end-to-end design analysis. Privacy threat modeling may be adapted to take advantage of agile techniques.
Thanks to the focus on face to face communication, extra space may be made to tackle challenges that require intellectual effort (e.g. C9, C10, C11, C14). Furthermore, meetings between different development teams can be designed to discus solutions to challenges caused by groups of components or services (i.e. C16, C17, C20). Finally, some challenges (C18, C21) require serious thought devoted to overcome them; in order to facilitate the discussion, it may be helpful to have multiple people considering the privacy goal at hand so that differences are expressed and independently validated by every attendee.
Additionally, working software as a measure of progress may help to place strategic mitigations thanks to the need of providing a working product on which to base further development. If the system is stable and functional between minor releases, developers can enhance the architecture thanks to their familiarity to the relationships between components. A better architecture may aide in identifying common threats and common solutions to privacy goals. As these mitigations are implemented and tested, they become part of the existing functionality and developers will be able to consider the impact of new changes into them. Moreover, managers can enforce the fulfillment of the corresponding requirements as effort has been devoted to them, making privacy an integral part of the software development practice.
However, despite such arrangements, the constant evolution introduced by the working software principle affects the ability to perform a complete analysis of the software product. In total, transforming TM into an iterative process that embeds uncertainty and flexibility into each of its activities is the overall challenge that Agile brings and that needs to be addressed going forward.
B. Services: challenges and opportunities
Services allow for parallelization and verbose documentation, but they make end-to-end analysis and coordination more difficult.
The independent development and deployment of different services enable a TM process where slow tasks can be done in parallel, e.g. to let experts work without blocking the development of the overall application. Challenges due to slow execution (C7, C10, C13, and C15) or difficulty (C4, C8, C11 and C12) can be partially overcome by parallelizing the processes that make them slow or difficult.
At the same time, the self-describing nature of services provides an opportunity to embed information about the components in a structured form. This new source of information is an opportunity to formalize e.g. the purpose of the service, which is vital to achieve privacy goals such as Data minimization or Accountability. Developers can alleviate challenges caused by the acceleration of development in agile environments by relying on this data to produce a global understanding of the application that changes as new services introduce more functionality.
However, similar to Agile, Services also complicate endto-end analysis due to the combination of independent services. As the number of services grow, threat compositionality becomes intractable as conflicts between threats of different services are more likely. Furthermore, addressing and validating threats that affect multiple services becomes challenging as there is no common infrastructure to implement their mitigations.
VII. DISCUSSION
Threat Modeling can play a critical role in the engineering of privacy preserving systems developed in an agile environment and making use of services.
However, our analysis shows there are numerous challenges to performing traditional threat modeling activities given current software development practices. Specifically, these challenges stem from certain agile principles and service properties, and can directly impact the achievement of one or more Privacy Goals.
Most importantly, agile methodologies and service-oriented architectures make it difficult to perform an end-to-end analysis of the system design and, consequently, of the associated privacy problems and solutions. This means, privacy as confidentiality and privacy as control will have to be achieved and validated incrementally. While an incremental approach may have become common practice to achieving privacy as practice, how an incremental approach would inform, for example, data minimization techniques (PG4) is a topic of future research.
An incremental approach may also have benefits, since it requires developers to focus on privacy goals and threats specific to the iteration, while taking advantage of the communication efforts in agile teams. It may also enhance teams' ability to perform a wide gamut of experiments especially in fulfilling privacy as practice goals (PG8, PG9, PG10) that require user input and observation. Finally, the flexibility of continuous evolution may make it possible to quickly take measures to respond to threats to privacy goals as they materialize. Such a practice, however, should not be used to replace privacy threat modeling with a reactive approach that only discovers and responds to privacy threats as they occur in the wild.
Together with Agile and Services, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning have also come to play a greater role in the creation of software products. Looking forward, we expect a similar trend in the incorporation of privacy into them, reconfiguring how threat modeling is exercised. Projects like Amazon Macie [35] that aim to provide automated solutions to avoid the violation of privacy goals in a privacy-as-a-service fashion are exemplary of automated approaches to developing privacy functionality. However, automating privacy TM will face challenges in defining the purpose of the data, detecting all threats of an application, or explaining risk assessment algorithms among others.
Whereas privacy-as-a-service can solve certain privacy problems effectively and in an easy to integrate manner, the services architecture brings its own set of problems that could potentially be bigger than those which get solved by automated approaches like Macie. For instance, these service providers may become single points of failure, violating PG1. Additionally, these services may need to monitor every flow of data going in and out of the system, violating confidentiality of data at rest or in transit (PG2) and data minimization (PG4). Finally, it seems unlikely that a single service can address all privacy threats from other services; for instance, data minimization (PG4) may require each of them to change their public interfaces.
At the same time, the ability to raise the level of abstraction for developers through services, and the use of Machine Learning-generated code can also be beneficial to popularizing privacy enhancing technologies in mainstream products. Both services and ML code hide implementation details, enabling developers to focus on the architecture and the design of the products. Hence, teams will be more likely to find and address threats stemming from architectural and design choices, Finally, a focus on structured documentation already present in service oriented architectures, and solid and iterative progress coming from agile methodologies, may help to overcome the challenges coming from system flexibility and frequent delivery, by focusing the analysis on the more stable and well documented components.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Traditional Threat Modeling came to being in times when Waterfall methodologies and Monolithic software architectures were prevalent. The rise of interest in privacy by design has lent credence to the use of threat modeling also for privacy. This paper explores the challenges the shift towards Agile and Services bring to core threat modeling activities and highlights some of the opportunities for developing effective privacy threat modeling.
Our explorations into the challenges and opportunities that arise in agile service demonstrate that the future of privacy threat modeling is still in the making and is a fertile ground for engagement. It is yet unclear whether software development needs a completely different way of modeling privacy threats. Whatever the solutions, it will probably require rethinking threat modeling as well as existing software development practices and architectures. Similarly, the use of Artificial Intelligence 'developers' to fix the issues that service-oriented architectures currently have with regards to the traditional or new threat modeling activities requires further study. This paper provides an essential first step towards the completion of this task. 
